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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
SHELLY HIPWELL, an individual 
by and through her guardians, 
SHERRY JENSEN and SHAYNE 
HIPWELL, 
Plaintiffs-
Respondents , 
Case No. 920218 
vs. t Priority No. 11 
ROGER SHARP, TIM W. HEALY, an : 
DOES I through X, 
i 
Defendants-
Appellants. : 
BRIEF OF INTERVENER STATE OF UTAH 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The State agrees with the statements of jurisdiction 
included in the parties' briefs. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The State has no direct interest in the outcome of this 
case and appears pursuant to its statutory right under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-30-11 to be heard on the constitutional issues raised by 
the parties. Therefore, this brief addresses only those issues 
stated in the parties' briefs. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
The following constitutional and statutory provisions are 
attached as Addendum A. 
Utah Constitution, article I, section 11. 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-3, -4, -10 and -34 (1989). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The State understands the nature of the case, course of 
proceedings below and facts to be as set forth in the parties' 
briefs. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The appellants' contention that the proprietary/ 
governmental distinction did not apply to the State or its 
subdivisions at common law, but only to municipalities, is well-
founded. Thus, Hipwell had no common law remedy against any 
governmental entity for the injuries she sustained at the 
University Hospital. Moreover, under the discretionary/ministerial 
function distinction as applied at common law to determine official 
immunity, Hipwell had no remedy against any government employee for 
those injuries. Thus, the damages limitation provisions of the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act did not transgress Hipwell's rights 
under the open courts clause. Neither were Hipwell's due process 
or equal protection right infringed by the Act where the Act did 
not deprive her of any common law right of recovery. 
Even if Hipwell had a constitutionally protected interest 
in recovering for her personal injuries, the analysis of the 
plurality in Condemarin warrants reexamination. In weighing the 
individual right infringed against the extent to which that 
particular infringement only would protect the public treasury, the 
Condemarin balancing test fails to take into account the overall 
effect of the Act in broadening individual remedies for 
2 
governmental torts. Whatever the constitutional basis of review, 
that overall effect must be considered to avoid straight-jacketing 
the legislature in a manner that prevents it advancing legitimate 
governmental objectives. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE PROPRIETARY/GOVERNMENTAL DISTINCTION DID 
NOT APPLY TO THE STATE AT COMMON LAW 
As explained in the appellants' briefs, the proprietary/ 
governmental distinction did not apply to the State or its 
subdivisions at common law, but only to municipalities. Indeed, in 
arguing that at the time of the adoption of the open courts clause 
the State engaged only in functions that would be considered 
governmental under the proprietary/governmental test, Hipwell 
concedes that a right to recover for personal injuries resulting 
from proprietary functions of the State had not been established at 
that time. As stated by this Court in Berry v. Beech Aircraft 
Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 676 n. 3 (Utah 1985), "the common law at the 
time of statehood provides a measure of the kinds of legal remedies 
that the framers must have had in mind (at least in scope if not in 
form) for the protection of life, property, and reputation." Thus, 
the open courts clause does not protect any right to recover for 
personal injuries resulting from proprietary functions of the 
State. 
Hipwell's hypothesis that state government existed in 
only a primordial form at the time of the adoption of the 
3 
constitution is completely unsupported.1 Moreover, the since the 
common law on governmental liability continued to develop even 
after the adoption of the constitution, at least until the adoption 
of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act in 1965, Hipwell's hypothesis 
fails to explain why, as she concedes, no case arose during that 
time allowing recovery against the state based upon the 
governmental\proprietary test.2 
Hipwell's interpretation of the Bingham v. Board of 
Education of Oaden Citv, 223 P.2d 432 (Utah 1950), is inaccurate. 
Had this Court applied the governmental/proprietary distinction to 
the particular function that caused the injury in that case, it 
would have denied the city immunity. The injury in Bingham arose, 
not from the school board's alleged negligent performance of its 
educational function (i.e., as in failing to teach Jane and Johnny 
to read and write), but from the operation of an incinerator to 
burn books on school grounds — a proprietary function. Thus, it 
^ipwell cites Green v. Commonwealth, 435 N.E. 2d 362, 365 
(Mass. App. 1982) in support of her hypothesis. That case, 
however, recognized that, before the enactment of the Massachusetts 
Tort Claims Act, the "exception for private nuisance was the only 
judicially created exception to the otherwise general principle 
that the Commonwealth was immune from tort liability absent a clear 
statutory authorization to the contrary." The Massachusetts court 
went on to expressly overrule the lower court's decision applying 
the proprietary/governmental distinction to the state on the ground 
of stare decisis. Thus, Green refutes, rather than supports 
Hipwell's theory. 
2Meanwhile, courts in numerous other jurisdictions expressly 
declined to apply the distinction to the state. See James, Tort 
Liability of Governmental Units, 22 U. Chi. L. Rev. 610, 619-20 & 
n. 55 (1955). The more plausible explanation for the absence of 
any Utah cases directly on point is that the nonapplicability of 
the distinction was scarcely to be doubted. 
4 
was the character of the school board itself, rather than the 
nature of the particular function that gave rise to the injury, 
that shielded the city from liability. The same holds true for the 
Campbell Bldg. Co. v. State Road Comm'n, 70 P.2d 857 (Utah 1937), 
case also cited by Hipwell. In both cases, the court considered 
the purpose of the agency involved (i.e. whether or not it was 
performing a governmental function) in determining whether the 
agency was an arm of the state to be accorded absolute immunity and 
accorded no significance to the particular function that gave rise 
to the cause of action.3 Cases such as Bakken v. State, 219 N.W. 
2d 834 (N.D. 1928) (declining to apply sovereign immunity to the 
operation of the North Dakota Mill & Elevator Association by the 
state) are similarly explained and thus fail to support Hipwell's 
theory. See also. Union Trust Co. v. State of California, 99 P. 
183, 188-89 (Cal. 1909) (holding board of works immune for breach 
of contract on ground that "the opening of streets and the 
condemnation of the necessary lands . . . are among the most 
familiar governmental powers"); Bank of the United States v. 
Planter's Bank of Georgia, 24 U.S. 904, 907-08 (1824) (holding the 
Eleventh Amendment does not apply to action by the United States to 
recover as assignee of promissory notes issued by a bank of which 
the state was an incorporator, recognizing that "many States of 
this Union who have an interest in Banks, are not suable even in 
3It is worth noting that under the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act, immunity for negligence claims such as those apparently 
involved in Bingham and Campbell would likely be waived. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30-10. 
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their own Courts; yet they never exempt the corporation from being 
sued. The State of Georgia, by giving to the Bank the capacity to 
sue and be sued, voluntarily strips itself of its sovereign 
character, so far as respects the transactions of the Bank, and 
waives all the privileges of that character.") 
II. 
IN LIMITING THE REMEDY FOR WRONGS COMMITTED BY 
GOVERNMENTAL EMPLOYEES TO THAT AGAINST THE 
GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY, ABSENT FRAUD OR MALICE, 
THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT FULLY 
COMPORTS WITH THE OPEN COURTS CLAUSE 
Hipwell correctly observes that the fact that the State 
was absolutely immune at common law, regardless of whether the 
particular function that caused the plaintiff's injury is 
characterized as proprietary or governmental, does not end the open 
courts inquiry. To the extent section 63-30-4(4), which limits 
recovery against government employees personally to cases in which 
fraud or malice is established, infringes upon any common law right 
of recovery, it must be also be examined under the open courts 
clause. This is a more complex question than was recognized in 
Hipwell's brief. 
A. The Act Created Remedies Where None Existed At 
Common Law Against Either The Governmental Entity Or Its Employees 
First, Hipwell assumes, without analyzing the issue, that 
there existed at common law a broad right to recover for personal 
injuries against employees of a state-owned hospital. This was far 
from the case. 
Recognizing that a suit against a public officer was 
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often in effect a suit against the state, and that, if held 
personally liable for their official judgments, responsible 
individuals would either be discouraged from accepting public 
employment or be unduly intimidated in carrying out their duties, 
courts granted public employees extensive immunities at common law. 
Indeed, as acknowledged in 1955, ten years before the enactment of 
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, "The courts have tended in 
recent years to build up a larger and larger area of privilege or 
immunity for the officer with respect to his official conduct." 
Fleming James, Jr., Tort Liability of Governmental Units and Their 
Officers, 22 U. Chi. L. Rev. 610, 640 (1955)• 
The discretionary/ministerial function distinction was 
the most widely-applied basis of official immunity at common law.4 
Under the discretionary/ministerial function analysis, an official 
was held liable only for ministerial acts, but not for acts which 
required the exercise of discretion or judgment. See, e.g., 
Connell v. Tooele City, 572 P.2d 697, 699 (Utah 1977). 
In 1946, the term "discretionary function" was imported 
into the realm of governmental entity liability by the Federal Tort 
Claims Act ("FTCA"), which partially waived the absolute sovereign 
immunity of the United States. Section 2680(a) of Title 28 of the 
United States Code excepts any claim based on the exercise or 
performance, or failure to exercise or perform, a discretionary 
AOthers include the absolute immunity granted judicial 
officers and the good faith immunity generally accorded prison 
officials. See, e.g., Sheffield v. Turner, 212 Utah 2d 314, 316-
17, 445 P.2d 367, (Utah 1968). 
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function or duty from the FTCA's waiver of the United States' 
immunity from liability for injuries caused by the negligence or 
wrongful conduct of its employees. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). 
Under the FTCA, the term "discretionary function" 
acquired a new, more restrictive meaning than it had in the common 
law of official immunity. "Beginning with the two root cases of 
Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 73 S.Ct. 956, 97 L.Ed. 1427 
(1953) and Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 76 
S.Ct. 122, 100 L.Ed. 48 (1955), the lines in federal cases have 
been consistently drawn between those functions ascribable to the 
policy making level and those to the operational level." Little v. 
Div. of Family Services, 667 P.2d 49, 51 (Utah 1983). Since the 
policy/operational distinction developed under the FTCA, it had 
never applied to the common law of official immunity. See, e.g., 
Kendall v. Stokes, 44 U.S. 86 (1845) (post-master general immune 
from liability for writing-off debt to plaintiff); Hicks v. Davis, 
163 Pac. 799 (1917) (state auditor refused to determine validity of 
claim against state). Cf. Bovce v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 866 
(S.D. Iowa 1950) (United States immune from liability for damages 
caused negligent dynamite blasting); Harris v. United States, 205 
F.2d 765 (10th Cir. 1953) (United States immune from liability for 
negligent herbicide spraying). Cf. Bermann, Integrating 
Governmental and Officer Tort Liability, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 1175, 
1182 & n. 49 (1977) (noting that whether official and entity 
liability are co-extensive depends on whether the term 
"discretionary" is given the same meaning for purposes of both 
8 
governmental and officer immunity). 
The difference in the meaning of the term "discretionary" 
in the two contexts was expressly recognized in Estate of Burks, 
438 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1970). In Burks, the court rejected the 
argument that a Veterans' Administration hospital administrator and 
psychiatrist should be held liable for negligently permitting the 
escape of a mental patient, stating: 
Appellant urges that "discretion" means 
the same thing in the context of executive 
privilege as it does under the Tort Claims 
Act, where the government has been held liable 
for negligence in the treatment or custodial 
care of patients. 
We cannot agree that "discretion" can be 
read so narrowly as it is now under the 
Federal Tort Claims Act, which has been 
liberally interpreted to provide a remedy 
against the government. The Act's liberal 
construction ought not to be extended to limit 
the immunity of federal employees. Liability 
of the government itself for wrongs committed 
by its employees will not have the same 
inhibiting effect on governmental operations 
as the personal liability of an official. The 
Tort Claims Act seeks to bar only those suits 
where the "discretion" is that involved in the 
formation of policy, rather than its 
operation. 
Id. at 234. Accordingly, the court held the hospital director 
immune and stated, "[w]hile Doctor Ging [the treating psychiatrist] 
had less discretion, nevertheless in her diagnoses and treatment of 
patients and in her supervisory powers over other employees she was 
vested with discretion. She is entitled to immunity from suit." 
Id. at 235. 
Thus, contrary to Hipwell's assumption, courts generally 
found government physicians immune for medical malpractice and 
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similar claims at common law. See also, Martinez v. Schrock, 537 
F.2d 765 (3d Cir. 1976) (Army surgeons immune from allegedly 
negligent performance of gall bladder operation on civilian); 
Taylor v. Glotfeltv, 204 F.2d 51 (6th Cir. 1952) (prison 
psychiatrist immune from liability for allegedly defamatory 
diagnosis of patient's mental condition).5 
In interpreting the "discretionary function" exception of 
the Utah Act, this Court has followed the lead of cases 
interpreting section 2680(a) of the Federal Tort Claims Act. See 
Doe v. Arquelles, 716 P.2d 279, 282-83_ (Utah 1986); Little v. Div. 
of Family Services, 667 P.2d 49, 51 (Utah 1983); Frank v. State, 
613 P.2d 517, 519 (Utah 1980). Thus, the scope of the 
discretionary function exception as applied to governmental 
entities under the Act is far narrower than the immunity for 
discretionary functions accorded employees at common law. In 
permitting liability against the entity in circumstances in which 
5Cf. Brown v. Northville Regional Psychiatric Hospital, 395 
N.W. 2d 18 (Mich Ct. App. 1986) (medical decisions are 
discretionary and protected by governmental immunity); but see 
Jackson v. Kelly, 557 F.2d 735 (10th Cir. 1977) (adopting Federal 
Tort Claims Act definition of discretionary in holding Air Force 
physician liable on medical malpractice claim). As Jackson 
demonstrates, the interpretation of discretionary function under 
the FTCA influenced the subsequent development of the law of 
federal official immunity. Nevertheless, the Indian Towing 
definition of discretionary function was never adopted by the 
United States Supreme Court in determining official immunity. See 
Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 292, 298 (1988) (declining to "define 
the precise boundaries or official immunity or to determine the 
level of discretion required before immunity may attach"). In the 
federal realm, the issue of official immunity has been largely 
resolved by an amendment to the FTCA which expressly immunizes 
federal employees. See Federal Employee Liability Reform & Tort 
Compensation Act of 1988, 1988 Amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 2679. 
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the employee would have been immune at common law under the 
discretionary/ministerial function doctrine, the Utah Act 
significantly broadens individual remedies for personal injuries 
for governmental activities. 
B. Even Where A Remedy Existed Against Governmental 
Employees At Common Law. The Utah Governmental Immunity Act 
Provides A Constitutionally Adequate Substitute Remedy 
Even in cases in which the government employee would have 
been found liable under the discretionary/ministerial function test 
at common law, the limited substitute remedy against the 
governmental entity provided by the Act satisfies the open courts 
clause. 
In upholding the Workers' Compensation and Automobile No-
Fault Insurance Acts, this Court recognized that a limited remedy 
may be substituted for a more complete common law remedy without 
transgressing the open courts clause where other benefits of the 
substituted remedy compensate for the loss in the scope or value of 
the original remedy. See Masich v. United States Smelting, 
Refining & Mining Co., 191 P.2d 612 (Utah 1948) (workers 
compensation); Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P. 2d 670, 677 
(Utah 1985) (discussing workers compensation and automobile no-
fault insurance provisions). 
In substituting a limited remedy against the governmental 
entity for the common law remedy against the individual employee, 
the Act has significantly enhanced the chances of actual recovery 
for the victims of governmental torts in two ways: 
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1. The Act substituted a solvent defendant for an often 
financially irresponsible defendant. 
In the opening paragraph of his essay, Integrating 
Governmental and Officer Tort Liability, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 1175 
(1977), George A. Bermann recognized that recent reforms curtailing 
sovereign immunity were meaningful because " [e]ven in situations in 
which litigants already had a cause of action against individual 
public officials, making the government amenable to suit has 
enhanced the chances of actual recovery, since officials often lack 
the means to satisfy judgments rendered against them." In 
advocating the integration of the rules governing liability for 
governmental entities and their employees, Bermann contrasted 
systems based primarily on official liability with those primarily 
based on entity liability. As to the former, Bermann recognized 
that "[u]nless all public officials are made to carry a generous 
quantity of liability insurance, or governments are made to carry 
it for them, their frequent incapacity to satisfy large judgments 
would make any such system unacceptable." Jd.. at 1190. 
The relevance of this factor to the open courts question 
was recognized by Justice Durham's understated observation in 
Condemarin that "[t]here is no reason to believe that individual 
employees . . . are more able than their employers to respond in 
damages or that the entities themselves are likely to be judgment 
proof." 775 P.2d at 361 • In fact, the substituted remedy against 
the entity is far more certain, and thus more valuable, than the 
lost remedy against the individual. 
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Thus, the concern expressed in Condemarin that the 
limited remedy under the damages caps was grossly inadequate to 
fully compensate the seriously injured has significantly less 
weight where the remedy that was eliminated was the common law 
remedy against individual governmental employees. A multi-million 
dollar judgment against one person in a government comprised of 
"armies of anonymous and obscure civil servants" is likely to be 
just as inadequate. See Fleming James, Jr., Tort Liability of 
Governmental Units and Their Officers, 22 U. Chi. L. Rev. 610, 640 
(1955). See also Id. at 643 ("The rule of immunity of officers for 
discretionary acts, and its extension, represent a judgment that 
the benefits to be had from the personal liability of the officer 
(especially since the prospect of actual compensation to the victim 
from that source is slight) are outweighed by the evils that would 
flow from a wider rule of liability."); Kenneth Culp Davis, 3 
Administrative Law Treatise § 26.02 at 514 ("In the past, liability 
of ministerial employees for their unintentional torts has been of 
little consequence, for such employees usually have been 
financially irresponsible.") 
Here, the parties have made no representations about the 
financial responsibility of the medical resident who allegedly 
negligently performed the bone marrow biopsy that caused Hipwell's 
injuries and, ultimately, her death. It is likely, however, that 
even if they were entitled to recover against the resident at 
common law, the plaintiffs would be little more satisfied with that 
remedy than they are with their settlement against the hospital. 
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Nor the concept of indemnification have improved 
Hipwell's chances of full recovery. As Bermann observed, "[t]he 
most curious aspect of indemnification may be the widespread 
assumption among scholars that it is in fact practiced . . . . 
Yet, the assumption that the government generally indemnifies its 
officials for service-related judgments, or pays those judgments 
for them, may not be warranted . . . . Fifteen years ago, when the 
California Law Revision Commission investigated the sovereign 
immunity problem for what was to become the state's governmental 
tort claims legislation, it found the practice of indemnification 
to be 'haphazard and incomplete.' The little research that has 
been done elsewhere tends to support this conclusion." Moreover, 
a "major drawback" of indemnification is that "because tort victims 
still would have an action only against the individual official, 
their interest in compensation would remain subordinate to the 
latter's ability to pay." Integrating Governmental and Officer 
Tort Liability, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 1175, 1193-94 (1977). 
2. The Act enhances the chances of recovery by 
eliminating the need to establish the fault of any individual 
government employee. 
In advocating a system based primarily on the liability 
of the governmental entity, rather than the employee, Bermann 
cogently observed: "A further justification for accepting a 
broader scope of governmental than officer liability is that some 
losses occasioned by governmental activity may not be traceable to 
any particular official. For example, legislation may impose 
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duties upon the government that the latter simply fails to 
implement. . . • More generally, however, a governmental operation 
may suffer from inefficiency, delay or other systemic disorders 
that cannot be laid at the feet of any particular official yet 
still cause injury that warrants compensation." Jd. at 1187. 
While some cases, including this one, present no problem 
in identifying the potentially culpable party, a large class of 
cases exists in which the alleged fault is systemic — i.e., no 
particular blameworthy individual exists. In the latter class of 
cases, the substitution of a claim against the entity for the claim 
against the individual actually creates a remedy where none existed 
before. 
Moreover, even where individual blame can be assessed, 
the benefits gained by eliminating the need to pinpoint 
responsibility in such cases are significant and inure to both the 
plaintiff and the state. As noted by Bermann: 
[T]he principle of exclusive governmental 
liability offers distinct advantages from the 
point of view of litigation. In its absence, 
plaintiffs tend to sue multiple defendants as 
a means of enhancing the likelihood of 
ultimate recovery. An immediate consequence 
of joining individual officials and the 
government as defendants is that the official 
may need independent legal representation in 
order to enjoy a conflict-free defense. The 
cost of those services may pose a major 
financial hardship. Even if the government 
pays the bill, as is often the case, the cost 
will consume precious tax dollars. 
Furthermore, adding defendants increases the 
complexity of litigation in nearly every 
procedural respect. Compounding parties 
usually means compounding substantive issues 
as well. Although removing the individual 
official as defendant normally will not remove 
15 
him as witness, it may lessen and even obviate 
the need to resolve issues such as good faith 
or reasonableness upon which personal immunity 
may depend. Sole governmental liability, in 
short, promises aggrieved persons adequate 
compensation for their losses while 
eliminating the temptation to inject 
unnecessary defendants and issues into the 
litigation. 
Id. at 1195. In eliminating the need to prove individual 
liability, the Utah Governmental Immunity Act materially increases 
the chance that at least some recovery will be obtained, thus 
substantially improving the plaintiff's position from that at 
common law. 
III. 
NEITHER EQUAL PROTECTION NOR DUE PROCESS 
CREATES A RIGHT TO RECOVER FOR PERSONAL 
INJURIES WHERE NO SUCH RIGHT IS ENCOMPASSED BY 
THE OPEN COURTS CLAUSE 
Hipwell contends that regardless of whether a right 
protected by the open courts clause is at stake, the damages caps 
offend both equal protection and due process by restricting an 
individual right to recover for personal injuries that exists 
independently of the open courts clause. Contrary to Hipwell's 
suggestion that such a right was implied in Condemarin v. 
University Hospital, 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989), Justice Stewart, a 
member of the plurality in that case, expressly disapproved any 
reliance upon a substantive due process rationale. j[d. at 369. 
Moreover, Hipwell's contention appears to go well beyond 
even the minority approach of Justices Durham and Zimmerman in 
Condemarin, whose separate analyses were both firmly grounded in 
the open courts clause. The minority recognized that to the extent 
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a previously existing right to recovery had been abrogated, the 
open courts and due process guarantees overlapped. Therefore, 
disagreeing with Justice Stewart, they deemed a due process 
analysis which permitted a more flexible approach appropriate. 775 
P.2d at 356-360 (J. Durham) and 366-69 (J. Zimmerman, concurring). 
It is a giant leap from that view to according due process 
protection to rights of recovery that had never previously existed. 
POINT IV 
THE ABROGATION OF SOME COMMON LAW REMEDIES 
WHILE EXPANDING OTHER AVAILABLE REMEDIES WAS A 
REASONABLE MEANS OF ACHIEVING IMPORTANT 
LEGISLATIVE OBJECTIVES 
In concluding his comprehensive analysis of the reform 
movement that significantly abrogated the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity in many states, including Utah, Arvo Van Alstyne noted the 
emergence of limits on the trend: 
What is occurring is, quite obviously, 
not the total demise of the long-criticized 
irresponsibility of public bodies for their 
torts, but a restructuring of the rules which 
determine when a tort committed by 
governmental action is compensable. A full 
measure of public tort liability comparable to 
that of private persons and private 
corporations is manifestly not realistically 
to be expected of the present movement. 
[Emphasis in original.] On the contrary, the 
persistence of significant areas of 
governmental immunity from liability for 
injuries resulting from acts and omissions of 
public employees will undoubtedly continue to 
be characteristic of the law of most, if not 
all, states. It is already clear that the 
crumbling citadel of immunity has stronger 
foundations than had been generally perceived. 
The rule of governmental irresponsibility for 
tortious injuries may have yielded to 
crippling assaults upon its most vulnerable 
outposts, but the inner bastions have 
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generally survived the attack, more secure, 
apparently than before. 
In short, while substantially broader 
liability is being increasingly accepted by 
governmental bodies, a revised rationale has 
begun to crystalize around a new and more 
sharply defined set of hard-core governmental 
immunities. The traditional conceptual 
distinctions (e.g. the "governmental" 
"proprietary" dichotomy) which so often 
confused the prior law and bemused its critics 
are being increasingly abandoned. Instead, 
recent developments stress the identification 
of functional distinctions rooted in pragmatic 
policy considerations as the most appropriate 
guides to liability vel non . . . . 
In the long run, the continuing ostensible 
abrogation of governmental tort immunity will 
be seen more as a general reordering of the 
terms and conditions of governmental tort 
responsibility than an eguating of public and 
private tort law concepts. 
[Emphasis added.] Governmental Tort Liability: A Decade of 
Change, 1966 U. 111. L. Forum 919, 979-80. 
Thus, despite the strong criticism that resulted from 
their having been extended to an extreme, the traditional 
justifications underlying the principle of sovereign immunity 
remain sound. Unlike any private entity, no matter how large, 
government provides a wide array of services that are essential to 
the public, which can be performed effectively by no other entity 
and which subject it to far greater potential liability than any 
private party. Unlike a private party, which may simply go out of 
business or seek the protection of the bankruptcy court to avoid an 
obligation (thereby leaving its tort victims uncompensated), 
government, having the power to tax, is the ultimate "deep-pocket." 
Given the economic and political restraints on taxation, however, 
18 
result of the vast potential liability of the state could be such 
severe cutbacks in essential governmental services as to seriously 
hamper state government. "It is now recognized that under modern 
concepts of tort law, the wide and varied activities of governments 
may subject those entities to such liability that their activities 
will be stymied. It is also recognized that in order to be 
effective, government must often be active, innovative and 
unafraid." Thomas W. Rynard, Insurance and Risk Management for 
State and Local Governments, § 6.01 at p. 4 (Matthew Bender 1991).6 
Characterized by Van Alstyne as a "rare instance of 
legislative initiative," the Utah Governmental Immunity Act was a 
carefully fashioned response to these legitimate concerns. 
Governmental Tort Liability; A Decade of Change, 1966 U. 111. L. 
Forum at 966. The 1965 Act was preceded by a $25,000 two-year 
study by a special committee of the Legislative Council of the 
conditions under which immunity should be waived. Report and 
Recommendations of the Utah Legislative Council 1963-65 (Addendum 
B). The committee gathered extensive data on the experience of 
other states, including those in which sovereign immunity had been 
judicially abolished. Ld.; see also 36th Utah Legislature, Record 
of Senate Proceedings, January 18, 1985, comments of Sen. Charles 
6As the quoted statement suggests, Condemarin's requirement 
that any infringement on a common law right of recovery be 
"urgently and overwhelmingly necessary" is unduly restrictive and 
essentially anti-governmental in effect. To be effective, 
government in a complex, post-modern society must be more than 
simply solvent. 
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Welch, Jr.7 
As recognized by this Court, and as shown in Point III 
above, the overall effect of the Act was to "considerably broaden" 
governmental liability. Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 
P.2d 1230, 1235 (Utah 1980). That broadening, however, was 
accomplished not by simply expanding governmental liability across-
the-board, but by "reordering the terms and conditions of 
governmental tort responsibility." Because the common law of 
governmental tort liability depended on conflicting rules of 
sovereign and official immunity, which in turn rested on such 
unsatisfactory concepts as the discretionary/ministerial function 
distinction, such a reordering necessarily involved the abrogation 
of previously existing rights of recovery. 
Thus, although~the common law permitted recovery against 
individual governmental employees in some circumstances while 
foreclosing it against the state, the reasons for granting immunity 
to employees may be stronger than those for shielding the 
7Condemarin noted that "[t]here is no factual showing in the 
legislative history or the trial court that the recovery limitation 
is reasonably necessary for preservation of the public treasury." 
Because the Committee files were destroyed in accordance with State 
record-keeping requirements, the bulk of the legislative history of 
the Act is simply unavailable. The Court's suggestion that the 
legislative policy must be justified by a factual showing in the 
courts improperly treats the legislature as, in effect, a court of 
record. If such a factual showing is deemed necessary, however, 
the State agrees with Hipwell that this case should be remanded to 
the trial court to provide the State the opportunity to make such 
a showing. The State was not given notice of this action until 
after this interlocutory appeal was taken and thus has had no such 
opportunity here. 
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governmental entity: 
The absence of the government's vicarious 
liability also means little assurance of 
recovery to the victim of injurious official 
action. Since neither his master nor his 
supervisor shares the officer's liability, any 
recovery must come from the financially 
weakest link in the chain. Such a principle 
of liability may be likened to an inverted 
pyramid; from a viewpoint which stresses the 
importance of compensation and wide 
distribution of losses among the beneficiaries 
of the enterprise that causes them, the 
present system is well-nigh the worst that can 
be imagined. 
"All in all, the traditional Anglo-American system of state 
immunity coupled with the officer's liability may well be appraised 
in Professor Robson's words;" 
'The liability of the individual official for 
wrongdoing committed in the course of his duty 
on which so much praise has been bestowed by 
English writers, is essentially a relic from 
past centuries when government was in the 
hands of a few prominent, independent and 
substantial persons, so-called Public 
Officers, who were in no way responsible to 
ministers or elected legislatures or councils 
. . . Such doctrine is utterly unsuited to 
the twentieth century state, in which the 
Public Officer has been superseded by armies 
of anonymous and obscure civil servants, 
acting directly under the orders of their 
superiors, who are ultimately responsible to 
an elected body. The exclusive liability of 
the individual officers is a doctrine typical 
of a highly individual common law. It is of 
decreasing value today.' 
Fleming James, Jr., Tort Liability of Governmental Units and Their 
Officers. 22 U. Chi. L. Rev. 610, 639-40 (1955). 
The objective of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act in 
limiting recovery against government employees personally to cases 
of fraud or malice was to correct this inverted pyramid. Indeed, 
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this Court recognized as much in Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627, 
633 (Utah 1983): "The apparent purpose of these two paragraphs 
[sections 63-30-4(3) and (4)] is to replace the common law of 
official immunity and its distinction between discretionary and 
ministerial acts or omissions with a new standard coordinated with 
the standard of governmental immunity established in the 
Governmental Immunity Act." 
The balancing test used in various forms by the plurality 
in Condemarin assesses the constitutionality of the abrogation of 
common law remedies against government employees according to the 
extent to which those particular remedies would threaten the public 
treasury. Ironically, that test fails even to take into account 
the overall effect of the Act in "considerably broadening" other 
remedies. Aside from whether an equal protection or due process 
analysis is appropriate, or whether minimal or heightened scrutiny 
is required, Condemarin failed to accord appropriate weight to the 
individual benefits created by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
Even absent an "essentially comparable" substitute remedy for a 
particular right that has been abrogated right by the Act, Berry v. 
Beech Aircraft Corp. , 717 P.2d 670, 680 (Utah 1985), the broadening 
of other remedies by the Act must be taken into account in 
assessing its constitutionality. Taking that effect into account, 
the Act's substitution of a limited remedy against the governmental 
entity for the common law remedy against the employee was a 
reasonable means of achieving important legislative objectives and 
should be upheld. 
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CONCLUSION 
Hipwell had no common law remedy against the State for 
the injuries she sustained at the University Hospital because the 
proprietary/governmental distinction did not apply to the State or 
its subdivisions at common law and the State was absolutely immune 
from liability. Neither did Hipwell have a claim against any 
governmental employee for medical malpractice under the 
discretionary/ministerial function distinction as applied at common 
law. Thus, the damages caps did not transgress Hipwell's rights 
under the open courts clause. Neither were Hipwell's due process 
or equal protection right infringed where the caps did not deprive 
her of any common law right of recovery. 
In substituting a limited remedy against the governmental 
entity for the common law remedy against the individual, the Act 
provided an "essentially comparable" remedy and thus complies with 
the open courts clause in any event. Moreover, taking the 
broadening of other remedies by the Act into account in assessing 
its constitutionality, the substitution of a limited remedy against 
the governmental entity for the common law remedy against the 
employee was a reasonable means of achieving important legislative 
objectives. Therefore, the damages caps should be upheld. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this '/ day of December, 1992. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
DEBRA y. MOORE 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
Sec. 11. [Courts open - Redress of injuries.] 
AH court, shal! be ^ X ™ ™ X 0 ~ ^ * * * 
History: Const 1896. 
63-30-3. Immunity of governmental entities from suit. 
Except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter, all governmental 
entities are immune from suit for any injury which results from the exercise 
of a governmental function, governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home, or 
other governmental health care facility, and from an approved medical, nurs-
ing, or other professional health care clinical training program conducted in 
either public or private facilities. 
The management of flood waters and other natural disasters and the con-
struction, repair, and operation of flood and storm systems by governmental 
63-30-3 STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL 
entities are considered to be governmental functions, and governmental enti-
ties and their officers and employees are immune from suit for any injury or 
damage resulting from those activities. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 3; 1978, ch. 27, Amendment Notes. — The 1985 amend-
§ 2; 1981, ch. 116, § 2; 1984, ch. 33, i 1; 1985, ment inserted "and other natural disasters" in 
ch. 93, { 1. the second paragraph. 
63-30-4. Act provisions not construed as admission or de-
nial of liability — Effect of waiver of immunity — 
Exclusive remedy — Joinder of employee — Lim-
itations on personal liability. 
(1) Nothing contained in this chapter, unless specifically provided, shall be 
construed as an admission or denial of liability or responsibility insofar as 
governmental entities or their employees are concerned. If immunity from 
suit is waived by this chapter, consent to be sued is granted and liability of the 
entity shall be determined as if the entity were a private person. 
(2) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as adversely affecting any 
immunity from suit which a governmental entity or employee may otherwise 
assert under state or federal law. 
(3) The remedy against a governmental entity or its employee for an injury 
caused by an act or omission which occurs during the performance of such 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 63-30-4 
employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority 
is, after the effective date of this act, exclusive of any other civil action or 
proceeding by reason of the same subject matter against the employee or the 
estate of the employee whose act or omission gave rise to the claim, unless the 
employee acted or failed to act through fraud or malice. 
(4) An employee may be joined in an action against a governmental entity 
in a representative capacity if the act or omission complained of is one for 
which the governmental entity may be liable, but no employee may be held 
personally liable for acts or omissions occurring during the performance of the 
employee's duties, within the scope of employment or under color of authority, 
unless it is established that the employee acted or failed to act due to fraud or 
malice. 
History: L, 1965, ch. 139, 5 4; 1978, ch. 27, Payment of medical and similar expenses 
t 3; 1983, ch. 129, § 3. not admissible to prove liability for injury, 
Cross-References. — Compromise and set- Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 409. 
tlement, § 63-30-18. 
63-30-10. Waiver of immunity for injury caused by negli-
gent act or omission of employee — Exceptions — 
Waiver for injury caused by violation of fourth 
amendment rights [Effective until July 1, 1990]. 
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury 
proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed 
within the scope of employment except if the injury: 
(a) arises out of the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or 
perform a discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is abused; 
or 
(b) arises out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, mali-
cious prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel, slander, 
deceit, interference with contract rights, infliction of mental anguish, or 
civil rights; or 
(c) arises out of the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of, or by 
the failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke, any permit, li-
cense, certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization; or 
(d) arises out of a failure to make an inspection or by reason of making 
an inadequate or negligent inspection of any property; or 
(e) arises out of the institution or prosecution of any judicial or admin-
istrative proceeding, even if malicious or without probable cause; or 
(f) arises out of a misrepresentation by the employee whether or not it 
is negligent or intentional; or 
(g) arises out of or results from riots, unlawful assemblies, public dem-
onstrations, mob violence, and civil disturbances; or 
(h) arises out of or in connection with the collection of and assessment 
of taxes; or 
(i) arises out of the activities of the Utah National Guard; or 
(j) arises out of the incarceration of any person in any state prison, 
county, or city jail or other place of legal confinement; or 
(k) arises from any natural condition on state lands or the result of any 
activity authorized by the Board of State Lands and Forestry; 
(1) arises out of the activities of: 
(i) providing emergency medical assistance; 
(ii) fighting fire; 
(iii) regulating, mitigating, or handling hazardous materials or 
hazardous waste; or 
(iv) emergency evacuations; or 
(m) arises out of research or implementation of cloud management or 
seeding for the clearing of fog. 
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GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 63-30-10 
(2) (a) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury 
proximately caused or arising out of a violation of protected fourth 
amendment rights as provided in Chapter 16, Title 78 which shall be the 
exclusive remedy for injuries to those protected rights. 
(b) If Section 78-16-5 or Subsection 77-35-12(g) or any parts thereof are 
held invalid or unconstitutional, this Subsection (2) shall be void and 
governmental entities shall remain immune from suit for violations of 
fourth amendment rights. 
63-30-34. limit of judgment against governmental entity 
or employee. 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (3), if a judgment for damages for 
personal injury against a governmental entity, or an employee whom a gov-
ernmental entity has a duty to indemnify, exceeds $250,000 for one person in 
any one occurrence, or $500,000 for two or more persons in any one occur-
rence, the court shall reduce the judgment to that amount, regardless of 
whether or not the function giving rise to the injury is characterized as gov-
ernmental. 
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (3), if a judgment for property damage 
against a governmental entity, or an employee whom a governmental entity 
has a duty to indemnify, exceeds $100,000 in any one occurrence, the court 
shall reduce the judgment to that amount, regardless of whether or not the 
function giving rise to the damage is characterized as governmental. 
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GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 63-30-35 
(3) The damage limits established in this section do not apply to damages 
awarded as compensation when a governmental entity has taken or damaged 
private property without just compensation. 
History: C. 1953, 63*30-34, enacted by L. - Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
1983, ch. 130, § 3; 1987, ch. 75, § 9. ment added to the end of Subsections (1) and 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1983, (2) "regardless of whether or not the function 
ch. 130, § 3 repealed former § 63-30-34, as giving rise to the injury is characterized as 
amended by Laws 1979, ch. 94, § 3, relating to governmental," rewrote Subsection (3), and 
excess judgments, and enacted present
 made minor changes in phraseology. § 63-30-34. 
ADDENDUM B 
STATE OF UTAH 
Report and Recommendations of 
the Utah Legislative Council 
1963-1965 
PURSUANT TO TITLE 36, CHAPTER 4, SECTIONS 2 
AND 11, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1853 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
DECEMBER, 1964 
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the court in habitual truancy cases, clarification of the role of the pro-
bation officer, provision for some publicity in major delinquency cases, 
clarification of the general purpose statement, definitions of neglected 
and dependent child, qualifications of the probation staff, additional Judge-
ship for the second district and appointive powers of the senior Judge, also, 
designation of the chief probation officer and defining action where adults 
contribute to the delinquency of a juvenile. 
The Committee recommends the Juvenile Court Act as representing an 
effective, efficient, and conscientious effort on the part of well-qualified 
individuals who have worked to prepare a bill in the best interests of the 
State. 
Governmental Immunity 
The 1963 Legislature directed the Council "to study the effects upon 
states, their political subdivisions and municipal corporations of waiver 
of immunity from suit and consenting to be liable for the torts of its 
officers, employees, and agent? as outlined in H.J.R. 21 of the 35th 
Legislature." (S.J.R. 14, item 2.) The Legislature considered this study 
of such importance that it separately appropriated the sum of $25,000 and 
directed the Council to appoint a committee with at least one-third of the 
membership from the legal profession. The Council appointed a committee of 
twenty-one members, with representation from the Legislature, the cities, 
counties, special taxing districts, school districts and other interests. 
Bills have previously been introduced in the Legislature to .aive 
governmental immunity. In 1961 a bill was passed, then vetoed by the 
Governor and in 1963 a bill was introduced but failed to pass. 
Research activities include field investigations, gathering of data, 
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assimilation of information, formulation of proposals, drafting of legisla-
tion, and the preparation of a final report. Investigations of the claims 
experience of the State and its political subdivisions has been included in 
the Committee study. The extent of insurance coverage by governmental entit 
the cost of such insurance and claims experience have been part of the stud) 
Questionnaires were sent to other states in regard to tort claims and conse-
quential damage claims. The statutes of other states have been reviewed anc 
catalogued. The Utah Code has been carefully examined, section by section. 
Case decisions have been studied. Conferences have been held with insurance 
personnel and rating information has been obtained from the National Bureau 
of Casualty Underwriters. Seven working drafts of legislation have been pri 
pared and studied by the staff, by Committee members, and by the Executive 
Committee. 
The Committee considered the important questions of whether government, 
icsnunity from suit was important in the State and whether legislation was 
needed. 
Numerous citizens have been injured in their person and property by 
negligent acts of government employes and by the construction of public 
improvements. In many of these cases no recourse against the governmental 
entity has been possible. It was found that the present system wurks sub-
stantial injustice to citizens. There is a fear, however, among government 
officials, that to open the door to unrestrained claims would be too burden 
aome upon governmental funds. 
The Committee concluded that immunity of governmental entities should 
be waived in relation to responsibility for the negligent acts or omissions 
of public employees. The Committee was not unanimous in its opinion regard 
ing responsibility for consequential damage. This latter type of claim is 
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for indirect or consequential damage resulting from the construction of pub-
lic improvements. It is not necessarily the result of any negligence but is 
merely the consequence of a particular government activity. 
The question of payment of claims was a matter of concern to the Committee. 
It was found that there is already a limited waiver of immunity in the State. 
For example, cities and towns can be sued and must respond in relation to de-
fective streets, sidewalks, culverts, and bridges. The State Road Commission 
has discretionary authority to pay individual claims up to $3,000 for injuries 
resulting from the negligence of its employees. The Fish and Game Commission 
must pay for crop damage resulting from wildlife. It was also found that 
83/i of the political subdivisions responding to the survey already carry auto-
mobile insurance, and 307. of those carry comprehensive liability insurance. 
On the basis of the best experience available, it appears that vehicle 
insurance premiums and costs will show little increase should immunity be 
waived, but there may be an increase of as much as five to six times in the 
cost of general liability insurance. There would probably be more claims 
filed and some additional administrative costs incurred in handling these 
claims. 
There was unanimous approval by the committee members that governmental 
entities should be legally authorized to purchase liability insurance to pro-
tect both the entity and the employee. 
At the present time claims against the State are reviewed by the Board 
of Examiners and then passed on to the Legislature for its review and approp-
riation or refusal* If a state agency is not otherwise authorised by law to 
pay claims, then the authority of the Board of Examiners must be recognized 
and claims must be channelled through the Board. 
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The Committee has prepared a draft of legislation patterned after that 
adopted in California and in some other states. This legislation reaffirms 
the rule of governmental immunity, thus eliminating any confusion in the lav, 
and then carves out specific exceptions where, as a matter of justice, immu-
nity from suit should be waived. No effort is made in the bill to create new 
or unique rules of substantive liability as far as governmental agencies are 
concerned. Where immunity is waived, liability or responsibility would then 
be determined by the courts. 
A second bill has been prepared which is simply an authorization for the 
permissive purchase of liability insurance. This latter bill does not waive 
immunity. It would solve the problem of immunity only insofar as the govern-
mental entity chooses to purchase liability insurance, thereby referring all 
claims to an insurance carrier. 
If the Legislature meets the question of governmental immunity head-on, 
it can consider the comprehensive draft which defines specific exceptions to 
immunity and also provides for insurance coverage. The second draft merely 
permits the purchase of insurance coverage by the governmental entities. 
The Committee recommends legislation to solve the problem of govern-
mental immunity. 
Justice of Peace 
A follov-up to the study made by a State Bar Committee prior to the 
1963 Legislature to determine the advisability of reforming the J. P. system 
was assigned to a committee of the Council. The Committee believes legisla-
tion is needed to accomplish the objectives of the assignment. The J. P. 
system is in need of reform and the Committee is preparing legislation to 
permit the establishment of "community courts." 
